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Petitioner Prosper, Inc. respectfully submits its reply brief on appeal.

ARGUMENT
I. PROSPERS REPLY TO THE BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The Workforce Appeals Board (hereinafter "Board") in its Brief (hereinafter B.
at

), states that it "supplements and corrects" Prosper Inc.'s (hereinafter "Prosper")

Statement of Fact. Prosper responds1 to the Board's supplemental facts as follows:
•

In paragraph 1, the Board, without reference to the record, states "The employer
provides online classes to customers in a variety of subjects." (B. at 2, paragraph
2). Prosper does not provide online classes.

•

In paragraph 2, the Board states "When the employer sent information, including
claimant's email address, to the claimant's students, the employer misspelled the
claimant's name by using O-N at the end instead of E-N." (B. at 2, paragraph 2).
The testimony given by Katrina Iversen (hereinafter "Iversen") is that with one
student her name was spelled O-N instead of E-N. (R. at 102, lines 33-34). The
Board inaccurately states that the condition applies to "students" rather than a
single student.

•

In paragraph 3, the Board states that Prosper "believed the claimant was not
responding to student emails" and that Prosper "believed the claimant was
missing appointments." (B. at 4, paragraph 3). Iversen by her own testimony
admits to missing appointments (R. at 101, lines 15-19) and similarly admits that

1

The Board's late filing of its Brief does not relieve Prosper of its responsibility to
correct any inaccuracies in the Board's presentation of the facts.
1

her responses to students were at times untimely. (R. at 103, lines 27-33). It is
inaccurate to state that Prosper "believed" these conditions were occurring.
•

In paragraph 4, the Board states "The claimant had been given approval to work
from home when she was hired and was later asked not to work from home." (B.
at 4, paragraph 4). Though not wholly inaccurate, the record reflects that Iversen
was told not to work from home. (R. at 088, lines 1-4). This requirement was
confirmed in the disciplinary warning of September 9, 2005. (R. at 007).

•

In paragraph 7, the Board states a hearing was scheduled for "August 7, 2006".
(B. at 5, paragraph 7). The hearing date was April 11, 2006 (R. at 069).

•

In paragraph 7, the Board states "The employer was sent notice of the hearing
and an appeals brochure which instructed the employer to contact the witnesses
and make sure they would be able to participate in the hearing."(B. at 5,
paragraph 7). This statement is not supported by the record. Though it may be
standard business practice for the Department of Workforce Services to send
employers its appeals brochure, there is no reference to the brochure in the
record. The Board's inclusion of the appeals brochure as Addendum E
inappropriately augments the record.

•

In paragraph 9, the Board states "The employer did not ask any of the
complaining students to testify at the appeals hearing before the ALJ . . . ." (B. at
5, paragraph 9). The Board assumes facts not in evidence. There is nothing in
the record to substantiate that Prosper did not ask complaining students to testify.

2

II. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD MISINTERPRETS THE
LAW.
Hypothetical: After a long week at work, Julie is looking forward to dining at
her favorite restaurant. Upon being seated, she is disappointed to see that the server is
the same server that waited on her a few weeks ago. She hopes that today the service is
better. Once again she is disappointed. In fact, if anything, the service is worse. The
server is chewing gum, he mixes up the orders, and above all, he sneezed on the table.
Not wanting to make a scene, Julie mentions to the Hostess her dissatisfaction. To her
surprise, the Hostess responds: "We know his performance is poor, but without direct
testimony, we cannot terminate him for cause. Would you be willing to testify about
his performance at his unemployment hearing?"
Though the preceding hypothetical may not actually occur, the inferences drawn
therefrom are obvious. If in the example the server had intentionally poured coffee on
Julie and was terminated for it, then the restaurant may need to rely on direct testimony
to establish the grounds for termination. By contrast, if the complaint that Julie lodges
is the ninth customer complaint in the last two months, the restaurant does not need to
prove the particulars of the complaints only that the complaints are occurring. As the
restaurant is concerned about protecting its reputation and satisfying customers, it is not
the specifics of the complaints at issue, but rather, the body of complaints being
received by the server.

3

A. Hearsay Under Evidence Rule 801(c).
Pursuant to R994-405-202(l)(2005), employers can discharge employees when
the employee's conduct jeopardizes its rightful interests. In the hypothetical, the
server's conduct was impacting the restaurant's legitimate interests and reputation. If
the restaurant doesn't take steps to terminate the server, its reputation and business will
be negatively impacted.
Similarly, Iversen's receipt of 40-50% more complaints than other coach was
impacting Prosper's legitimate business interests. Not only was Prosper concerned

2

Jason Coulam testified that Iversen received 40 to 50 percent more complaints than
any other coach. The Board is critical of this testimony stating that Prosper presented
no evidence to support its estimate. (B at 18). However, under Rule 701 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, non-experts are able to form opinions that are rationally based on
perception and helpful about a fact in issue. Additionally, Coulam's estimate was in
direct response to a question by the ALJ:
Judge:

Okay, and let me ask you this. To your knowledge, did she have
more complaints than any other coach?

Coulam:
Judge:
Coulam:

Absolutely.
And give me a percentage. Was it ten percent more? I meanI've been doing this, you know, as I've stated, as a coaching
director for four years. We have close to 85 coaches that are
currently employed with us. I would say, as a percentage, you
know, it's hard to say, but I would say that she received anywhere
from 40 to 50 percent more complaints than any other coach has.

As it was the ALJ that solicited the testimony, it was incumbent upon the ALJ as the
examining party to elicit additional testimony about the estimate if there were concerns
about its accuracy or admissibility.

4

about resolving the specific customer complaints, but Prosper was also concerned about
protecting its image and reputation. (R. at 079, lines 17-27). In terminating Iversen,
Prosper properly relied on the occurrence of complaints without having to prove the
particulars of each complaint.
Under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 801(c), out of court statements are
admissible as non-hearsay. If evidence is offered to establish the existence of a fact,
then such evidence can be admitted as not hearsay. In State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332
(1993), Olsen argued that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of two UPS
employees. The Court stated:
We conclude that the court correctly allowed the testimony of the UPS
employees because the statements allegedly made by Nichols were offered for
purposes other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The testimony was
introduced to prove that the statements and inquiries were in fact made. It was
also admitted to show that Nichols and Powell were at the site of the robbery
under unusual circumstances and that Nichols acted in an unusual manner prior
to the robbery. Therefore, these statements were not hearsay and were properly
admitted at trial. Id at 335.
See also cases cited in footnote 3.
3

State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987)(officer's testimony regarding a
conversation with informant was not hearsay because it was admitted to explain the
police officer's conduct); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1985)(bank
reconciliation and agency records admitted to show their condition and contents); State
ex rel G.Y. v. State, 962 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(statements admitted to explain
actions taken in performing duties as caseworker); State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996)(out of court statements to be admitted to explain actions); Provo City v.
Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 365-66 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(out of court statements was
admitted to explain a police officer's belief of exigent circumstances); Lay ton City v.
Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(officer's testimony regarding a
conversation he had with a store clerk to be admitted to explain the police officer's
conduct); Durfey v. Board of Educ., 604 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 1979)(employment
offered admitted to evidence good faith, not as proof of the substance of the offer).

5

A review of the records leads to the inescapable conclusion that Prosper was
concerned about the number of complaints Iversen was receiving.4 (R. at 007). The
record does not establish that any one particular complaint formed the basis of the
separation. It was the totality of the complaints that Iversen was receiving that led to
her termination. Prosper presented evidence of nine customer complaints received by
Iversen after September 9, 2005. (R. at 081, lines 7-8). The existence of the complaints
is not disputed. Iversen admitted under oath that the complaints were about her. (R. at
102, lines 4-8). Though Iversen sought to introduce a variety of explanations why the
complaints were happening, the complaints occurred at a rate of 40%-50% more than
any other coach. The Board argues that reliance on the existence of the complaints as
grounds for termination is "disingenuous" (B. at 11). However, Prosper provided nonhearsay evidence of the complaints to establish its state of mind in deciding that it
needed to discharge Iversen in order to protect its legitimate business interests. Under
Rule 801(c) the existence of the complaints is admissible evidence. As such, the Board
erred in not admitting the evidence of the customer complaints.

4

Just as the existence of the customer complaints led to Iversen's written disciplinary
warning, it was the existence of the customer complaints that formed the basis for her
termination.
5

There was no testimony that more was expected from Iversen than other coaches.
Other coaches had students transferred to them. Other coaches managed their schedules
and juggled time zones. All the coaches had essentially the same possibility of
receiving complaints. Yet Iversen's received 40 to 50 percent more complaints than
others coaches.

6

B. Protection of Due Process Rights.
Though the Board raises the issue that admitting customer complaints as nonhearsay under 801(c) would violate Iversen's due process rights, this Court has
addressed the issue previously.
In State ex rel G.Y. v. State, 962 P.2d 78, 85-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) a mother
lost custody of her children when they were adjudicated to be neglected. Appealing the
trial court findings, the mother argued that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay
evidence through a caseworker with the Division of Child and Family Services
("DCFS'n). The mother challenged the caseworker's testimony because it referred to
out-of-court statements contained in reports received by DCFS, but prepared by others.
After affirming the trial court's ruling that as the testimony was admissible as not
hearsay under 801(c), this Court went on to hold that in circumstance where testimony
is presented for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, parties are
not denied their due process rights by admitting such testimony:
Appellant also contends that the trial court violated her right to due process by
denying her the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Because Farr (the DCFS caseworker) had no personal knowledge of the
substance of the reports, appellant argues that she was deprived of any
meaningful cross-examination of those who prepared the reports and the contents
of those reports. . . . However, we determined that the out-of-court statements
introduced through Farr's testimony were not hearsay. Because the out-of-court
statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, appellant was
not denied any opportunity to confront or cross-examine the declarant. In this
circumstance, Farr was the declarant, testifying to her own actions, and her
statements were subjected to appellant's cross-examination, (emphasis added).
In this case, Iversen had the right to confront and cross-examine Prosper's
witnesses regarding the existence of the complaints. If the complaints had been
7

fabricated, Iversen could have uncovered such inaccuracies. However, Iversen's due
process rights regarding the testimony presented was protected. To hold otherwise
would misdirect the cross-examination from the existence of the fact, to the truth of the
fact. Because the evidence was presented to establish Prosper's state of mind in
terminating Iversen, Iversen's due process rights were protected. The Board's concerns
that Iversen's due process rights would be violated by admitting such evidence is
misplaced.

C. Hearsay Under Evidence Rule 803(6).
Even if this Court finds the existence of the customer complaints is not
admissible under 801(c), the existence of the complaints should have been admitted
under Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The record establishes that Iversen received a number of complaints against her.
(R. at 081, lines7-8). The Board affirmed in its Brief that the complaints were
documented in the regular course of the business. (B. at 4, paragraph 3). The records
were made at or close to the time of the occurrence of the complaints. Id. The integrity
of the record was preserved in Customer Management System ("CMS").6 Iversen
admitted that her interaction with students was tracked in CMS. (R. at 108, lines 27-31).

6

In its Brief, the Board supplements the facts stating that Prosper did not have any of its
Student Care employees testify at the hearing. (B. at 5). It also criticizes Prosper for
failing to provide any witness that did talk with the dissatisfied students. (B. at 6,).
This argument, however, is a red herring. Had the Student Care employees testified at
the hearing, the Board would have similarly argued that the testimony was inadmissible
hearsay.

8

There is no indication that the record lacked trustworthiness. Iversen did not challenge
the accuracy of the CMS record.
In State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court found that
records made in the ordinary course of business at or near the time of the occurrence of
the event carries a presumption of trustworthiness. Though the Board asserts that the
records lack trustworthiness, the Board inaccurately focuses its attention on the
complainants and not the record. (B. at 11).
Additionally, the Board suggests that Bertul excludes the existence of the
customer complaints. However, the language quoted in its Brief (B. at 10) in fact
supports admissibility. In Bertul, the Court stated that records of routine matters "such
as the day a crime was reported" are admissible. Id. at 1184. Therefore, Prosper's CMS
records that contain evidence "such as the day a customer complaint is made" are also
admissible.
Because the Workforce Appeals Board failed to consider the evidence of
customer complaints, the ALJ and Board misapplied the business records exception to
the hearsay rule under Rule 803(6). The ALJ and Board decision to exclude the
evidence of customer complaints is a reversible error.

7

Alternatively, pursuant to Administrative Rule R994-508-109(9)(2005) "Oral or
written evidence of any nature, whether or not conforming to the rules of evidence, may
be accepted and will be given its proper weight." Therefore, whether under Rule
801(c), Rule 803(6), or R994-508-109(9), the evidence of customer complaints should
have been admitted and considered. However, the record establishes that the ALJ and
Board deemed all Prosper's evidence inadmissible hearsay.

9

D. The Residuum Rule.
Each time the Department of Workforce Services has considered the Iversen
matter, it has cited to Mayes v. Department of Employment Sec., 754 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), for the proposition that the residuum rule prevents the admissibility of
Prosper's evidence. A review of the facts confirms that the residuum rule does not
apply in this case.
It is well established that hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative
hearings. See Utah Admin. Rules, R994-508-109(9)(2005). The checks and balances
imposed on Administrative Agencies to offset the unfettered introduction of hearsay
evidence is the residuum rule. The residuum rule requires that the findings of facts are
not based exclusively on hearsay evidence. Mayes v. Department of Employment Sec,
754 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In this case, however, even if Prosper's testimony and documentary evidence is
deemed exclusively hearsay, Iversen made admissions against interest as to the customer
complaints against her. Such testimony is admissible non-hearsay under Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2).8 Iversen herself testified:
Judge:

Okay, ma'am? I'm the one that makes the decisions. The
employer has testified that these were complaints about you-are
you saying that these complaints are not complaints about you?

Claimant:

I would say that the majority of the are-

Judge:

Okay. (R. at 102, lines 4-10).

8

Statements are not hearsay if "The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity. . . ." Utah R.
ofEvid., Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
10

Similarly on the issue of working from home:
Judge:

work from home? Now, Mr. Coulam has indicated that he told
you, specifically, you could no longer work from home. Is that
correct?

Claimant:

I did not agree.

Judge:

Well, you don't get to choose. If your employer tells you you don't
get to work from home any more-that's not something that you can
agree to or not agree to. I'm asking you-

Claimant:

(Unintelligible one or two words).

Judge:

I'm asking you, ma'am-did he tell you that you could no longer
work from home? In that meeting?

Claimant:

He asked me to move all of my sessions to Prosper, yes.

Judge:
Claimant:
16-38).

Okay, so you knew that they wanted you to work from the office?
I knew that they asked me to work from the office. (R. at 100, lines

In Wagstaff v. Department of Employment Sec, 826 P.2d 1069 (Utah App. 1992),
this Court specifically considered the residuum rule and admissions against interest.
Mr. Wagstaff was an Air Force civilian employee who was discharged for drug use. He
challenged the decision denying him unemployment benefits asserting he was not
terminated for just cause. In evaluating the claim, the Commission made a factual
finding that Wagstaff had used cocaine during his lunch break. The report contained
Wagstaff s own admission as well as co-workers1 statements. In affirming the denial of
unemployment benefits, this Court held that the admission by Wagstaff was sufficient to
satisfy the residuum rule. Id. at 1072, citing Rule 801(d)(2).

11

Similarly, in Hoskings v. Industrial Comm 'n.9 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
this Court citing WagstaffWiih approval stated: "This court held that the Commission's
finding of a single incident of drug use was supported by the employee's own
admissions, and thus was supported by a residuum of competent, non-hearsay
evidence." Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
In the present case, Iversen herself admitted under oath that the complaints were
about her. (R. at 102, lines 4-10). She also admitted that she had been told not to work
from home. (R. at 100, lines 16-38). As in Wagstaff, Iversen5s own admissions are
sufficient non-hearsay evidence under Rule 801(d)(2) to satisfy the residuum rule and
support her termination. It was reversible error for the Board to exclude Prosper's
evidence on Iversen's customer complaints and award unemployment compensation
benefits.

III. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD WAS ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE IN RULING THAT PROSPER
DID NOT ESTABLISH JUST CAUSE FOR DISCHARGING IVERSEN
FOR ATTENDANCE VIOLATIONS.
The Board in "supplementing and correcting" Prosper's Statement of Fact the
Board states:
6. The employer terminated the claimant's employment on February 23, 2006.
She was terminated for poor job performance and for working from home. (R,
86:25-27). ...(B.at4).
If the Board in supplementing and correcting Prosper's facts affirms that Iversen
was terminated "for working from home," then Iversen should have been denied
unemployment benefits. Though the Board will argue that Prosper would not have
12

terminated Iversen for working from home had her performance been acceptable, there
is sufficient direct testimony from Peterson, Coulam and Hardy that her performance
was not acceptable. (R. at 077, lines 17-20; 086, lines 25-40; 093, line 16). Even if all
evidence of customer complaints is excluded, Prosper provided substantial evidence that
Iversen was terminated for "working from home without approval." (R. at 005;
Peterson, R. at 077, lines 15-20; Coulam, R. at 086 lines 19-27; and Hardy, R. at 093,
lines 8-16). The Board has presented no convincing reason why it did not find that
Iversen was properly terminated for just cause for attendance violations alone. The
Board's decision on the issue of attendance violations must be reversed as being
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.

IV. PROSPER'S CHALLENGE OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DOES
NOT REQUIRE MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
FINDINGS OF FACT.
In Part III of its Brief, the Board argues that Prosper failed to marshal evidence in
support of the Board's decision.9 Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires that a party challenging a fact finding, to marshal the evidence that supports the
challenged finding.
In this case, it is the conclusions of law that are at issue. It is the conclusion of
law that Prosper's testimony and documentary evidence was exclusively hearsay that led

9

The Board confuses Prosper's burden of proof, with an appellant's obligation to
marshal evidence under 24(a)(9). For example, in its heading the Board states "The
Employer Failed to Marshal the Evidence is Support of its Appeal"; and in the first
paragraph the Board states 'The court should reject the employer's appeal for its failure
to marshal the evidence in support of its conclusion..." (B. at 21).
13

to the erroneous finding that "She [Iversen] was responding to student communications
promptly and was not missing appointment." (R. at 22). Therefore, correcting the
erroneous conclusion of law will lead to the correction of the erroneous findings of
fact.10
However, in order to fully satisfy any marshaling obligation it might have,
Prosper will address the only two Findings of Facts it would challenge. First, Prosper
would challenge the ALJ's finding that "the claimant was not unprofessional." (R. at
22). As Prosper did not assert that Iversen was terminated for being "unprofessional",
Prosper is unaware of any specific fact that supports the finding. Therefore, there is no
evidence to marshal in support of the finding.11
The second finding of fact that Prosper would challenge is the finding that "She
[Iversen] was responding to student communications promptly and was not missing
appointment." (R. at 22). The testimony that could be marshaled to supports this
finding is testimony provided by Iversen:
Judge:

Had they talked to you about missing appointments?

Claimant:

They had talked to be about specific clients-if a call came in or a
client said that I had missed a session-it was-Lorin would ask me
why I missed a session, or if I missed a session.

10

Rule 24(a)(9) requires a party challenging a finding of fact to marshal the evidence
that supports the challenged finding. In this case, Prosper cannot effectively challenge
any findings of fact without first correcting the conclusions of law. Otherwise, it is in
the untenable position of challenging the ALJ's findings of fact by citing to evidence
deemed by the ALJ and Board to be inadmissible.
11

The only reference Prosper is aware of regarding Iversen being unprofessional is
found in a student complaint about Iversen. (R. at 078-079, lines 41-43, 1-2).
14

Judge:

Uh-huh, and did you miss a lot of sessions?

Claimant:

No, I did not.

Judge:

Did you miss a session with Tim Clark?

Claimant:

No, I did not. (R. at 101, lines 15-27).

And as it relates to communication with students:
Judge:

Okay, were you responding within 24 hours to all of your email?

Claimant:

As much as possible, yes.

Judge:

What would keep you from responding within 24 hours?

Claimant:
Weekends. Midnight. Uh, over booking, over scheduling. (R. at
103, lines 27-33).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals
Board's decision affirming the Administrative Law Judge's award of unemployment
benefits to Iversen. This Court should find that Iversen was terminated for just cause.
DATED this

of December, 2006.

Daniel J. Anderson
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner
Prosper, Inc.
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